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LOCHNERIAN IDEOLOGY WHEN PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR CONTRACTS ARE
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NILA M. MEROLA†
INTRODUCTION
Rochelle Johnson is a state worker in Sacramento,
California. Ms. Johnson’s $38,000 annual salary has been cut by
approximately fourteen percent due to the state’s mandate that
more than 200,000 workers take three unpaid days off per
month.1 While her modest salary never allowed her to live in
luxury, Ms. Johnson now struggles just to keep the power on in
her home and to provide basic necessities for her two children.2
About her ability to make ends meet, Johnson professed, “I just
feel like I’m less than a parent.”3 Though the reduction in
liquidity has threatened the sustainability of Ms. Johnson’s
already conservative lifestyle, the slow stripping away of her
dignity is perhaps her greatest loss of all.
California’s furloughs—or involuntary,4 unpaid days off from
work5—are not a national outlier. In fact, twenty-five other
states have resorted to some type of furlough program in an

†
St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s University School of
Law; B.S., 2008, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
1
Shane Goldmacher, California; Workers Pay for Furloughs; Many Are Unable
To Make Mortgage or Car Payments or Even Buy Enough Food. Some Face
Bankruptcy. Biden and Feinstein Protest, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at A39.
2
Id. (noting that Ms. Johnson’s power had already been shut off once).
3
Id.
4
Not all furloughs are involuntary. Sometimes “furlough” is used to refer to a
vacation. However, this Note will refer to furloughs exclusively as involuntary
unpaid days off from work mandated by the state.
5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 745 (9th ed. 2009).
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effort to reduce enormous budget gaps.6 As half of the states
project a cumulative budget shortfall of $145 billion for fiscal
year 2010,7 the states’ desires to expeditiously identify and
implement measures to reduce these deficits are apparent.
However, some of the means chosen to achieve this goal—laws
that impose furloughs or wage freezes on unionized public sector
employees—may be an abuse of states’ police powers and an
unconstitutional impairment of public sector labor contracts.
In response to these laws, labor unions across the country
have sued, alleging that the furloughs and wage freezes violate
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, which
proscribes states from enacting laws that impair contractual
obligations.8 Most recently, a United States district court in
Maryland found that an employee furlough plan implemented by
Prince George’s County was unconstitutional under the Contract
Clause.9 Many unions view the Prince George’s decision as a
collective victory not only because the court invalidated the
furloughs but also, and perhaps more importantly, because the
court was willing to strictly scrutinize the furlough legislation.10
Indeed, before ultimately concluding that the furloughs were
unconstitutional, the court undertook a rather extensive analysis
of the furlough legislation, throughout which the court examined
whether the law was reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.11 The court showed great sympathy
for the policymakers’ plight of closing soaring budget gaps amidst
this “global recession” and acknowledged that a certain degree of
deference must be accorded to lawmakers’ fiscal decisions The
court also noted, however, that it “cannot merely give lip service
to the fundamental principles that undergird the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution” and that “[t]o do
otherwise, even in these severe economic times, would sanction

6
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ACTIONS & PROPOSALS TO
BALANCE THE FY 2010 BUDGET: STATE EMPLOYEE ACTIONS, FURLOUGHS AND
LAYOFFS (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17244.
7
Id.
8
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”).
9
See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty. (Prince
George’s I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 518 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir.
2010).
10
See id.
11
See id. at 510–18.
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the County running roughshod over the Unions, who in good
faith negotiated a binding contract with the County.”12 The
Prince George’s Court’s refusal to allow state legislatures to run
“roughshod”13 over public sector unions through an unchecked
use of police power and under the guise of fiscal necessity is
strikingly reminiscent of the now infamous, widely criticized, and
allegedly abandoned judicial activism of the “Lochner era,”
spawned by the 1905 Supreme Court decision, Lochner v. New
York.14
The labor unions’ Prince George’s victory, however, was
short-lived. On June 23, 2010, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court in a
nine-page opinion.15 Nevertheless, the district court’s opinion is
groundbreaking in its scrutiny of state legislation, instructive to
other courts analyzing similar issues and, indeed, the focus of
this Note.16 While the Fourth Circuit’s opinion will be discussed
only briefly, it is further evidence of the rift among the courts in
their willingness to strictly scrutinize state legislation under
Lochner-like jurisprudence.
In addition to the Prince George’s courts, other state, district,
and appellate courts around the country have elected to review
state legislation that impairs public contracts with greater
scrutiny.17 Because the laws in question are predominately
economic or social, this jurisprudential approach is quite
controversial, as, since the end of the Lochner era, greater
deference is typically given to the legislatures in determining
whether the laws are reasonable and necessary to achieve a
compelling public purpose.18 In fact, even the courts seem to be
split on whether second guessing legislative economic and social
decisions is an appropriate judicial role. While those courts that
are willing to give less deference to the legislature face criticism
from some for returning to Lochner-like judicial activism, these
courts should be applauded, rather than rebuked.
12

Id. at 518.
Id.
14
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15
See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty. (Prince
George’s II), 608 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2010).
16
Unless otherwise indicated, “Prince George’s” is in reference to the district
court opinion.
17
See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
18
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
13
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These courts deserve praise because they demonstrate that
the proper role of the courts is to say “no” only after a substantive
review reveals that legislation is inconsistent with the
Constitution, not because it is the judiciary’s job is to sit as a
super-legislature or because they invalidate laws based on
differing ideology or economic opinion.19
This type of
jurisprudence is not paternalistic protectionism but is, in fact,
the judicial function that Lochner stood for all along. Though the
Court claimed to have discarded Lochner in the 1930s, the
pendulum seems to be swinging back to a more scrutinizing
judiciary.
In fact, Lochner still lives in the fabric of
contemporary jurisprudence but now in a positive, responsible,
and more authentic capacity.
This Note argues that, despite its notorious reputation as the
case that permitted and encouraged judicial usurpation of the
states’ inherent police powers,20 a return to a Lochnerian level of
review of economic legislation is appropriate when state or local
legislatures pass laws that substantially impair public sector
labor contracts. Part I briefly recaps the Lochner era, beginning
with an overview of Lochner itself and culminating in a brief
discussion of the criticisms of Lochner. Part II introduces the
Contract Clause and demonstrates that the contemporary test for
determining whether there has been a Contract Clause violation
is similar to the Lochner Court’s analysis for whether the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee of
liberty of contract had been violated.
Part III reveals that Lochner’s legacy may positively live on
by protecting public sector employees from substantial
contractual impairments, despite the nefarious connotation of the
“Lochner” name. First, through an in-depth review of two cases,
Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George’s County21 and Buffalo
19
See Randy Barnett, A Libertarian View: Judicial Activism Is Necessary,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 27, 1987, at 13.
20
Federal Court of Appeals Judge Robert Bork denounced Lochner as “the
symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power.” ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44 (1991). Even
now, Chief Justice John Roberts, during his Senate confirmation hearings, criticized
Lochner: “You go to a case like the [Lochner] case, you can read that opinion today
and it’s quite clear that they’re not interpreting the law, they’re making the law.”
Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/
09/13/AR2005091300876.html.
21
645 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Teachers Federation v. Tobe,22 Part III shows that courts struggle
and vary with the amount of deference owed and given to state
legislatures. Additionally, Part III illustrates that, without strict
scrutiny, courts may be reluctant to find contract-impairing laws
in violation of the Contract Clause, leaving public sector
employees unprotected from unconstitutional state legislation.
In light of the tumultuous economy and the states’ increasing
resort to furloughs and wage freezes to close budget gaps, Part
III concludes with a call to the courts to responsibly use the
power that they wield and place a limit on the states’ “unbounded
power . . . where legislation of this character is concerned, and
where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought.”23
I.
A.

LOCHNER REVISITED

Lochner: Its Jurisprudential Ramifications, Progeny, and
Demise

In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court held that a New
York law proscribing a bakery employer from requiring or
permitting an employee to work more than ten hours in one day
or sixty hours in one week was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.24 The
Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects an
individual’s liberty to enter into contracts in relation to his or her
business and found that the New York law interfered with this
right.25 The Court did not hold, however, that the state can never
enact laws that interfere with constitutional liberties or rights.
Instead, the Court noted that state sovereignty is preserved
in the states’ inherent “police powers” to pass laws that restrict
individual liberties yet simultaneously serve the “safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the public.”26 The Court made
clear, however, that there must be limits on the states’ police
power.27 Otherwise, the Court opined, “the 14th Amendment
would have no efficacy . . . and it would be enough to say that any
piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the
22
23
24
25
26
27

464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
See id.
See id. at 53.
Id.
See id. at 56.
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health, or the safety of the people.”28 The rule, therefore, that
emerges from Lochner is that the states have the power to pass
laws that promote the public welfare. The judiciary, however,
has the power to determine whether those laws actually do
achieve a common social good or whether they are merely an
unnecessary and unreasonable restriction of individual liberties,
crafted under the pretext of state sovereignty.
Ultimately, the Lochner Court found that the law at issue
was an abuse of New York’s police powers.29 The Court stated
that there was no “reasonable” grounds for finding that the law
was neither “necessary [n]or appropriate” to safeguard the public
health, as the occupation of a baker is not an unusually
hazardous one.30 Moreover, the Court explained that bakers are
not a class inferior in intelligence or competence than men of
other trades or occupations so as to require the arm of the state
to interfere with a baker’s right to sell and an employer’s right to
buy labor on contractual terms that both parties see fit.31
Therefore, when the law’s end is not legitimate and the law itself
is a palpable invasion of a constitutional right, the courts must
find the state’s chosen means an unconstitutional interference
with individual liberties.32
The Lochner decision marked the beginning of an era in
which the judiciary strictly scrutinized the reasonableness and
necessity of state laws to ensure that the states did not overstep
their police powers.33 For the next thirty years, the Court freely
substituted its own judgment for that of the legislature and
invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and regulatory
measures.34 To illustrate, in the 1908 decision, Adair v. United
States,35 the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law banning
“yellow-dog” contracts—an adhesion contract imposed by the
employer upon the employee in which the employee, as a

28

Id.
See id. at 58.
30
See id. at 58–59.
31
See id. at 56–57.
32
Id. at 61–62.
33
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373,
373–74 (2003).
34
See id. at 373 (explaining that Lochner symbolizes an entire era in which the
Supreme Court struck down various social legislation, including minimum wage
laws and laws designed to enable employees to unionize).
35
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
29
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condition of employment, agrees not to join a union.36 In finding
the act at issue “repugnant to the 5th Amendment,”37 the Court
returned to laissez faire economic theory and, in language similar
to that in Lochner, deemed the “right of a person to sell his labor
upon such terms as he [considers] proper [to be] the same as the
right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions.”38 The
Court stated that an employer and his employees “have equality
of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract.”39 As seen in
Adair, the Lochner era cases recognized the existence of states’
police powers, but infrequently deferred to legislative
decisionmaking.40
Not until 1937 did the Lochner era come to an end.41 The
United States was beginning to recover from the deepest and
most prolonged economic depression in American history. It was
a time that today feels more familiar than it does distant and is
now more recognizable than it is obscure.42 As the tumultuous
economy of the 1930s began to raise American consciousness to
the improprieties occurring in the workplace, economic policy
began to shift from classical to Keynesian theory, and Lochnerian
ideology was abandoned.43 Additionally, the composition and

36

Id. at 180.
Id.
38
Id. at 174.
39
Id. at 175.
40
See generally Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (declaring
unconstitutional a New York state minimum wage law); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R.
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (declaring unconstitutional a federal statute establishing a
pension fund for railway workers); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(declaring unconstitutional a federal statute providing for minimum wages for
women and children in the District of Columbia); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that forbade employers to require
employees to agree not to join labor organizations).
41
See Strauss, supra note 33 (noting that West Coast Hotel marked the end of
the Lochner era and that “[b]y the early 1940s, Lochner’s status as a pariah was
secure”).
42
See Mitchell H. Rubenstein, Obama’s Big Deal; The 2009 Federal Stimulus;
Labor and Employment Law at the Crossroads, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 2 (2009)
(discussing the similarities between the economic situations faced by FDR and
Obama when they stepped into office and explaining the need for social change and
reform of labor and employment legislation).
43
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1358 (3d ed. 2000).
No longer could it be argued with great conviction that the invisible hand of
economics was functioning simultaneously to protect individual rights and
to produce a social optimum. The legal ‘freedom’ of contract and property
37
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philosophy of the Supreme Court had changed significantly since
Lochner.44 In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,45 the Court sustained
a state minimum wage law for women and noted that, when it
comes to the relationship between an employer and employee,
“the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion.”46 The
Court not only began to afford state legislatures greater
discretion in the exercise of their police powers,47 but also
departed from the notion that freedom of contract is an
untouchable constitutional right.48
Just two years after West Coast Hotel, Justice Stone, in
United States v. Carolene Products,49 inserted one of the most
talked about footnotes in constitutional law. Footnote four
suggested that the Court would apply minimal scrutiny—or
rational basis scrutiny—to economic regulation, but would apply
strict scrutiny to legislation that prejudiced personal rights, such
as freedom of expression or religion.50 The Court intimated that
a “more searching judicial inquiry” was necessary to protect
“discrete and insular minorities” when the political process
fails.51 Immediately following West Coast Hotel and Carolene
Products, the Supreme Court upheld a host of New Deal

came increasingly to be seen as an illusion, subject as it was to impersonal
economic forces.
....
Thus, the basic justification for judicial intervention under Lochner—that
the courts were restoring the natural order which had been upset by the
legislature—was increasingly perceived as fundamentally flawed. There
was no . . . economic order to upset or restore, and legislative . . . decision in
any direction could neither be restrained nor justified on any such basis.
Id.
44

See id. at 1359.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
46
Id. at 393.
47
See id. at 397–99.
48
See id. at 391–400.
49
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
50
See id. at 153 n.4; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene
Products, SUPREME CT. REV. 397, 399 (1988) (“By separating economic and personal
liberties, Justice Stone suggested that the Court might really mean what it said
about deference to the legislative will in economic cases.”); Richard A. Epstein,
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 703 (1984)
(“Today the general view is that constitutional protection is afforded to economic
liberties only in the few cases of government action so egregious and outrageous as
to transgress the narrow prohibitions of substantive due process.”).
51
Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
45
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legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act,52 the Fair
Labor Standards Act,53 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.54
In the next three decades, the Court moved further away
from the judicial activism of the Lochner era and sustained
numerous state economic legislations.55 In 1963, the Supreme
Court demonstrated that Lochner was but a distant memory in
Ferguson v. Skrupa.56 Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated
that “[i]t is up to the legislatures, not the courts, to decide on the
wisdom and utility of legislation,”57 and “[t]he doctrine that
prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins . . . and like cases—that
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since
been discarded.”58 Thus, Lochner was a dead-letter to most,
symbolizing a thirty-year hiccup in Supreme Court jurisprudence
with activist ideology that was at last a relic, rather than a
reality.
B.

Lochner’s Critics

Lochner is arguably the most rebuked Supreme Court
decision of all time.59 To “Lochnerize” is widely understood to
52

See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941).
54
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
55
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding a law
regulating opticians and optometrists); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (upholding a state “right-to-work” law that
barred a preference for union membership in employment decisions); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246–47 (1941) (upholding a Nebraska statute fixing
maximum fees for employment agencies).
56
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
57
Id. at 729.
58
Id. at 730.
59
See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
23 (1st ed. 1980) (describing Lochner as “one of the most condemned cases in United
States history . . . used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse” and noting “the
animosity and contempt that erupted against” the Lochner line of substantive due
process cases); Strauss, supra note 33 (stating that Lochner “would probably win the
prize, if there were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred
years”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604–05 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (warning against a return to Lochner-style judicial review characteristic
of laissez-faire economics and reiterating that “[t]he practice of deferring to
rationally based legislative judgments is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (internal
citations omitted)); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude workplace
regulation and criticizing the majority’s use of laissez-faire economic theory in its
due process analysis).
53

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1179 (2010)

1188

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1179

refer to a fundamental judicial error.60 The principal criticism is
that Lochner was wrong because it involved “judicial activism,” a
usurpation of the legislative branch’s traditionally and
constitutionally reserved lawmaking power.61 The Supreme
Court has perhaps been the biggest critic of Lochnerian
philosophy. In Lochner itself, both Justice Holmes and Justice
Harlan dissented. First, Justice Holmes rejected the premise of
limited government and took the position that the courts have no
right to “embody their opinions in law” and that “state laws may
regulate life in many ways which [the Court] as legislators might
think as injudicious.”62 Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White
and Justice Day, maintained that it was possible to place limits
on police power, yet still uphold the maximum hour legislation at
issue in Lochner.63
The Lochner dissenters urged the Court to exercise more
restraint in its scrutiny of state legislation and to afford state
legislatures a bit more deference in what policy truly did serve
the health, safety, and welfare of the public.64 In 1963, Justice
Black wrote that “the original constitutional proposition [is] that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies.”65 And most recently, in 2008,
Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion in
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue66 that

60
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (2d ed.
1988) (“ ‘Lochnerizing’ has become so much an epithet that the very use of the label
may obscure attempts at understanding.”); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment
During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (1996).
61
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987)
(explaining that the lesson learned from Lochner is that the Court should provide
more deference to legislative enactments).
62
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63
See id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64
See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 720–21 (2005) (referring to Justice
Holmes as “[t]he true outlier” by not joining Justice Harlan’s dissent and instead
offering a “parliamentary model of democracy: the legislature can do whatever it
likes”). But see Gerald Leonard, Holmes on the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1001,
1004–05 (2005) (stating that Holmes was “far from alone” in advocating substantial
deference to the legislature, and that Harlan’s words were “pretty strong, but they
only echoed the ‘reasonable doubt’ or ‘doubtful case’ rule”).
65
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
66
553 U.S. 16 (2008).
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“divining from the Fourteenth Amendment a right” not
enumerated in the Constitution “bears a striking resemblance to
our long-rejected Lochner-era precedents.”67
As indicated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence,68 part of the
judicial activism condemnation involves the argument that the
Lochner Court devised and enforced a right—“the right of
contract between the employer and employees”69—that is neither
explicitly stated in nor readily inferred from the text of the
Constitution.70
The Court stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that “no state can deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,”71 and
freedom of contract, while unenumerated, is nevertheless a
fundamental right.72 That freedom of contract is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and is, therefore, considered by many to
be attenuated at best. Like the criticisms of Roe v. Wade,73 in
which the Court found that, within the penumbras of the
Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, there lies a fundamental
“freedom of privacy”74—another right conspicuously absent from
the text of the Constitution—Lochner is admonished not only for
the Court supplanting its own judgment for that of the states75
but also for enforcing a right seemingly fabricated by the Court,
rather than conceived by the Framers.76 Despite these criticisms,
however, Lochner is still a part of American jurisprudence. And
when applied in the right circumstances, it operates as an
imperative check on state legislative power and affords the public
a safeguard from unconstitutional state legislation.

67

Id. at 32–34 (Thomas, J., concurring).
By stating that “divining from the Fourteenth Amendment a right” not found
in the Constitution, Justice Thomas seems to agree with Lochner’s critics that it is
not within the Court’s power to simply create constitutional rights that are not
readily found in the Constitution itself. Id. (emphasis added).
69
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
70
See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this
freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”); Strauss, supra
note 33, at 374, 378–81.
71
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
72
See id.
73
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74
Id. at 153 (“[The] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment[ ] . . . or . . . the Ninth Amendment[ ] . . . is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
75
See Sunstein, supra note 61.
76
See Strauss, supra note 33, at 374, 378–81.
68
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II. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE COURT’S LOCHNER-LIKE
LEVEL OF REVIEW
When examining claims under the Contract Clause, the
Supreme Court uses an analysis that is remarkably similar to
that of the Lochner Court. The Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”77 Like the
Fourteenth Amendment was in Lochner, the Contract Clause has
been, and still is, a check on the states’ police powers.78 While on
its face the Contract Clause appears absolute, it is not a complete
prohibition on the states’ rights to pass legislation to serve the
public interest, even if those laws incidentally impair contracts.79
Instead, the Court has devised a three-prong test to determine
whether a state has, in fact, violated the Contract Clause.80 The
application of this test has emerged most recently in determining
the constitutionality of furloughs imposed on unionized public
sector employees.81 Part II.A briefly explores the origins, history,
and contemporary revitalization of the Contract Clause. Part
II.B demonstrates that Contract Clause jurisprudence is not at
all different from Lochnerian Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process jurisprudence.
A.

Origin, History, and Contemporary Revitalization Origin of
the Contract Clause: The Framers’ Intent

The Framers’ intent in including the Contract Clause in the
Constitution is murky and provides little help to courts in
77

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21–24 (1977) (“[P]rivate
contracts are not subject to unlimited modification under the police power.”);
Thomas H. Lee, Jr., Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore: Does the
Contract Clause Have Any Vitality in the Fourth Circuit?, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1633,
1639–40 (1993) (“[T]he Court determined that the police power doctrine does not
excuse states from binding [contractual] obligations . . . .”).
79
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 20 (“Although the Contract Clause appears
literally to proscribe ‘any’ impairment, this Court observed in Blaisdell that ‘the
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula.’ ” (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 428 (1934))).
80
See, e.g., Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d 183, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2010); Buffalo
Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006).
81
See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 508–10 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608
F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
78
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understanding exactly how to apply the Contract Clause today.82
Perhaps most importantly, the origin of the Contract Clause
offers little guidance in how broadly or narrowly the clause is to
be construed.83 There is some indication that the clause was
drafted exclusively to protect creditor’s rights and to prevent the
states from enacting debtor relief laws in the aftermath of
Shays’s Rebellion—a post-Revolutionary War revolt by struggling
farmers aimed at stopping courts from carrying out
foreclosures.84 It is not conclusive, however, that this was the
Framer’s sole motivation in including the clause in the
Constitution.85 The principal question nevertheless remains:
How expansive is the Contract Clause’s scope?
Given its broad language, if read literally, the breadth of the
Contract Clause could potentially eviscerate state sovereignty
and greatly limit state police powers by not permitting the states
to enact any legislation that impaired contractual obligations, no
matter how incidental the impairment or how compelling the
larger societal interest.86 On the other hand, if interpreted too
narrowly, courts would essentially be writing a blank check to
the legislatures to enact whatever laws they choose, even if they
unnecessarily and unreasonably impair contractual obligations.
Despite these questions, not much is revealed from the political
and social context of the clause,87 and even less can be gleaned
82
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 707 (“There is very little reason to think that
the framers had any theory about the contract clause, or pondered its implications
for cases to which it would be applied.”).
83
See id. at 717.
84
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 326 (1999).
There is some authority that indicates that the policy underlying the Contract
Clause was chiefly to protect creditor’s rights. In 1785 and 1786, a depression
threatened the lives and businesses of small farmers. Id. at 461. The rise of
foreclosures prompted many states to enact laws staying foreclosures or excusing
debt. Id. Massachusetts, however, refused to adopt any of these measures, and the
farmers besieged local courts to prevent foreclosures. Id. One farmer, Daniel Shays,
organized a militia in an attempt to seize a military arsenal. Id. Though Shays’s
Rebellion failed, it convinced many state leaders that creditor’s rights needed
constitutional protection. Id. Three weeks after Shays’s Rebellion collapsed,
Congress passed a resolution calling for the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Id.
85
Nevertheless, the Contract Clause was obscurely worded, and the history of
the Court’s application of the clause demonstrates a strong suggestion that it was
not drafted exclusively for the protection of creditor’s rights. Id. at 326.
86
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 708.
87
See id. at 706 (noting that one possible interpretation is that the clause was
intended “to prevent the repudiation of foreign debts without interfering with the
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from the debates at the drafting and ratifying conventions, as the
Framers insisted that they be kept confidential.88 There is,
however, some agreement that the Contract Clause was included
because of the Framers’ strong beliefs that trade and commerce
were social goods and were best fostered by stability in
contractual obligations.89
Attempting to remedy the interpretive problems of the
Contract Clause through convention debates and its socialpolitical context is inconclusive.
Two other sources of
information, however, inform the debate: the context in which
the clause is written and the primary purpose of the Constitution
as a whole.90 First, the Contract Clause is situated in the same
section as the prohibitions of bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.91 A bill of attainder is an act of the legislature declaring a
person or group of persons guilty of some crime and punishing
them without benefit of a trial,92 and an ex post facto law is one
that unlawfully applies retroactively such as a law that renders
an act punishable when it was not illegal when committed.93 The
Framers, therefore, placed the Contract Clause alongside other
traditional modes of economic regulation undertaken by the states,” but that there
are “obstacles to making any definite link”). But see Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 257 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Framers intended that the Contract Clause be applied only to debtor-relief laws
because the clause was included in the same section as other provisions regulating
currency); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1934)
(contending that the Contract Clause was adopted because of the plight of debtors
following the revolutionary period); Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for
Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 188
(1985) (stating that the Framers intended the Contract Clause “to serve the limited
purpose of preventing the states from adopting debtor-relief laws”).
88
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 706.
89
See id.; see also U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[T]he
debates in the Constitutional Convention were of little aid in the construction of the
Contract Clause, but . . . the general purpose of the Clause [is] clear: to encourage
trade and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contractual
obligations.”).
90
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 710–17.
91
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This Clause states in full:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Id. (emphasis added).
92
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (9th ed. 2009).
93
Id. at 661.
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seemingly absolute prohibitions on state legislatures,
demonstrating that total judicial deference to state police powers
while considering laws that impair contracts is antithetical to the
Framers’ intent.94
Second, one of the primary purposes of the Constitution is to
place limits on the government at both the state and federal
levels.95 The Framers saw a potential for legislative abuse and
therefore, drafted clauses within the Constitution to curb
legislative power yet also conserve legislative ability to enact
laws that serve the health, safety, and welfare of the public.96
The Contract Clause imits legislative power and thus
substantiates the argument that complete judicial deference to
legislative decisionmaking is inappropriate when laws impair
contractual obligations.97
1.

The History of the Contract Clause: Case Law

The evolution of case law dealing with Contract Clause
violations is helpful in ascertaining the extent to which courts
are willing to invalidate state and federal legislation that impairs
contractual obligations. In 1810, Chief Justice John Marshall
expressed a desire to interpret the Contract Clause broadly.98 In
94

See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136–39 (1810).
See id. at 136–38.
96
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 715 (“The task of limited government, then, is
to forge those institutions that will control the abuses of trust without depriving
government of the powers needed to maintain the social order.”); see also Fletcher, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138 (noting that the Framers felt some apprehension in regard to
state sovereignties because they recognized “the violent acts which might grow out of
the feelings of the moment”). James Madison also commented on the need to place a
check on legislative power in the Federalist Papers:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has
directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation
that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting
personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential
speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less-informed part of
the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but
the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly
infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry,
and give a regular course to the business of society.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 294 (James Madison) (John Harvard Library ed. 2009).
97
See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
15 (1938) (arguing that at least some of the Framers understood the Contract Clause
to have a broader application); Epstein, supra note 50, at 715–17.
98
See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87.
95
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Fletcher v. Peck,99 the Supreme Court found a Georgia law that
rescinded a contract for the sale of land that was made by the
previous legislature unconstitutional under the Contract
Clause.100 This decision made clear that the Contract Clause
applies to public contracts—contracts to which the state is a
party—and private contracts alike.101 Just nine years after
Fletcher, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,102 the Court
specifically stated that salary contracts between the state and a
public officer would be afforded the same constitutional
protection as private employment contracts.103
Despite the Marshall Court’s expansive interpretation of the
Contract Clause, in the years following Marshall’s death, the
Court began to limit the protection of the Contract Clause and
afford state legislatures wider discretion.104 In Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,105 the Court upheld Massachusetts
legislation authorizing the construction of the Warren Bridge,
despite a previous act that granted the Charles River Bridge
Company an impliedly exclusive right to operate a toll bridge
over the Charles River.106 The Court held that all ambiguities in
public contracts would be construed in favor of the state,107
reasoning that a more draconian application of the Contract
Clause would unduly restrict the state’s police powers.108 Even
after Charles River Bridge, the Court continued to expand the
states’ police powers.109
99

Id.
See id. at 139. A 1795 Georgia Act divided a thirty-five million acre territory
into four tracts and sold them to four different development companies. Id. at 89–90.
Peck purchased land originally purchased under the 1975 Act. Id. at 127. Peck later
sold his land to Fletcher. Id. A subsequent Georgia legislature repealed the original
sale because it was discovered that the previous legislature sold the land because it
was influenced by bribes. Id. at 89–90. Fletcher brought suit against Peck claiming
that Peck sold the land without clear title. Id. at 127–28.
101
See id. at 137–38.
102
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
103
See id. at 694.
104
See Lee, supra note 78, at 1638.
105
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
106
Id. at 536–37.
107
See id. at 544.
108
See id. at 547.
109
See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). Mississippi amended its
constitution to prohibit lotteries after it had granted a charter to Stone to conduct a
lottery. Id. at 814–15. The Court held that the Contract Clause could not be used to
limit state police powers to protect the morals and health of the public. See id. at
819.
100
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Not surprisingly, during the Great Depression, the Court
was just as reluctant to invalidate legislation under the Contract
Clause as it was under the Fourteenth Amendment.110 In Home
Building & Loan v. Blaisdell,111 the Court upheld a Minnesota
law that superseded private mortgage agreements and allowed
mortgagors in default to delay foreclosure.112 In upholding the
law, the Court found five factors significant, thus creating a new
test for Contract Clause violations. The Court found that: (1) the
state legislature declared in the Act itself that there was an
emergency warranting homeowner protection;113 (2) the state law
was enacted to protect a basic societal interest, not a favored
group;114 (3) the relief was appropriately tailored to the
emergency that it was designed to meet;115 (4) the imposed
conditions were reasonable;116 and (5) the legislation was limited
to the duration of the emergency.117 While this test placed some
limitations on states’ police powers, the Court was still adamant
about deserting Lochnerian ideology and continued to defer to
the states’ discretion, especially in economic legislation.118
2.

The Revitalization of the Contract Clause

The more expansive application of the Contract Clause, once
envisioned by the Marshall Court, was finally reignited in the
1977 Supreme Court case, U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey.119 U.S.
Trust arose in the wake of a national energy crisis and as a result
of an attempt by New York and New Jersey to repeal a 1962

110
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 738 (noting that the police powers expansion in
Blaisdell “paved the way for massive government intervention that undermines the
security of private transactions” that has, today, “eviscerate[d] the [C]ontract[ ]
[C]lause”); Lee, supra note 78, at 1639.
111
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
112
Id. at 416–18, 448.
113
Id. at 444.
114
Id. at 445.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 447.
118
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. From the Depression and through
the early 1970s, the Court upheld state legislation based on the police powers
doctrine. While the five Blaisdell factors exposed the potential for a limit to state
police powers, no clear doctrine existed. See Lee, supra note 78; see also El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515–16 (1965) (upholding a Texas law imposing a statute of
limitations on a land redemption right because the law was necessary for the public
welfare and was only a “technical” impairment).
119
431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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covenant in the charter of the Port Authority that limited the
ability of the Port Authority to “subsidize rail passenger
transportation from revenues and reserves.”120 Port Authority
bondholders sued, alleging that the modification was a violation
of the Contract Clause.121 After the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the repeal,122 the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the repeal as a substantial, unreasonable, and
unnecessary impairment of a public contract.123
It is within U.S. Trust that the contemporary Contract
Clause doctrine is found, which both encompasses the Blaisdell
factors and elucidates some of the ambiguities that Blaisdell left
behind. Under U.S. Trust, a court must undertake a three-part
analysis to determine whether the Contract Clause has been
violated. First, the court must assess whether the legislation at
issue, in fact, impairs a contract.124 Second, the court must
determine whether the impairment is substantial.125 Third,
assuming that the impairment is substantial, the court must
then determine whether the impairment is nevertheless
reasonable126 and necessary127 to serve an important public
purpose.128
In determining whether the impairment is
reasonable and necessary when the state itself is a party to the

120

Id. at 3.
Id.
122
Id. at 3–4.
123
Id. at 28–31.
124
See id. at 17; see also Stephen J. McGarry, Public Sector Collective
Bargaining and the Contract Clause, 31 LAB. L.J. 67, 70 (1980) (noting that whether
an impairment has actually taken place is “based upon the subjective expectation of
the parties rather than the objective results of the state’s action”).
125
To determine whether an impairment is substantial, courts must look to “the
extent to which reasonable expectations under the contract have been disrupted.”
Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanitation
& Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997)); see
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28; Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1015
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244
(1978)).
126
In determining reasonableness, courts look to “whether the parties at the
time of contracting had foreseen possible changed circumstances.” McGarry, supra
note 124; see also U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32.
127
Necessity is “to be measured by whether there [are] less drastic means or
other alternatives available.” McGarry, supra note 124; see also U.S. Trust, 431 U.S.
at 29–30.
128
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28–29; see also id. at 25 (“[A]n impairment may be
constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose.”).
121
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contract, the U.S. Trust Court specifically stated that “complete
deference to a legislative assessment . . . is not appropriate
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”129 The Court,
therefore, created a more scrutinizing standard of review for laws
that impair public contracts, whereas almost complete deference
is accorded to legislative judgment when only private contracts
are impaired.130
After an initial finding that the repeal did constitute a
“serious impairment,”131 the U.S. Trust Court found that the
impairment was unnecessary for two reasons.132 First, the states
could have partially honored the covenant, rather than totally
repeal it.133 Second, the states could have accomplished their
goals of decreasing automobile use and encouraging mass transit
without modifying the covenant at all. For example, the Court
noted, the state could have taxed gasoline and parking or
increased bridge and tunnel tolls.134 Next, using a foreseeability
test, the Court found that the impairment was not reasonable.135
The Court pointed out that, though increasingly urgent because
of the energy crisis, the need for mass rail transit and the
problems associated with automobiles in the New York
metropolitan area was “not a new development” and that the
state had full knowledge of the concerns when they entered into a
covenant in 1962.136
As illustrated, by discussing the
foreseeability of a need for mass transit regulation at the time of
contract and by noting other feasible alternatives to the repeal,
the Court determined reasonableness and necessity through a
rather discerning lens, affording the legislature virtually no
discretion.

129
Id. at 25–26. This lower level of deference is referred to as the “less deference
standard.”
130
See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
412 n.14 (1983) (noting that the U.S. Trust reduced deference standard did not apply
because the state did not alter its own contractual obligations); Buffalo Teachers
Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 369 (explaining that when analyzing public contracts, courts use a
different approach than that employed in analyzing private contracts).
131
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28.
132
Id. at 29–30.
133
Id. at 29–30, 31 n.28.
134
Id. at 30, 31 n.29.
135
Id. at 31–32.
136
Id.
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Contract Clause Jurisprudence: Not a Far Cry from Lochner

The U.S. Trust doctrine, promulgated by the Supreme Court,
one of Lochner’s most steadfast critics, is tantamount to a return
to Lochnerian ideology. Both the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Contract Clause place restrictions on state police powers, and
although the Fourteenth Amendment assumed a greater role in
adjudicating states’ rights,137 the Contact Clause is not without
While Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
purpose.138
process jurisprudence and the slow to mature Contract Clause
doctrine grew up together, evolving side by side as America itself
underwent a multitude of changes, only in the modern era do
they meet in a significant way. Through both its explicit
statements—that less deference should be given to the
legislature139—and its scrutinizing reasonable and necessary
analysis,140 the U.S. Trust Court, like the Lochner Court, made
very clear that there are limits to state police powers and that
sometimes the court, not the legislature, must determine
whether laws are reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.
First, Lochner did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
placed unbounded limitations on state police powers.141 In fact,
the Court cited five cases in which it previously upheld state
legislation as a valid exercise of states’ police powers,142 including
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,143 in which the Court upheld state
legislation that intended to rectify the disadvantage that coal
miners faced in obtaining wages from their employers by
137

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
139
Id. at 25–26.
140
Id. at 28–31.
141
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54–56 (1905).
142
See id.; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12, 38 (1905)
(upholding state compulsory vaccination law); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 219,
222 (1903) (upholding state law prescribing the conditions upon which the state will
permit work of a public character to be done for a municipality); Knoxville Iron Co.
v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 16, 22 (1901) (upholding state law regulating the way in
which miners could obtain their wages); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900)
(upholding state law declaring that, as matter of law, keeping barber shops open on
Sunday was not a work of necessity or charity); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380,
395 (1898) (upholding state law limiting the hours of employment in all
underground mines or workings, smelting, and other institutions for the reduction or
refining of ores or metals to eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where
life or property is in imminent danger).
143
183 U.S. 13 (1901).
138
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mandating that the employer cash coal orders when presented by
the miner.144 Instead, both the Lochner Court and the U.S. Trust
Court simply stated that there should be limits on this police
power.145
Second, the U.S. Trust Court placed these limits on police
power through a reasonable and necessary doctrine similar to
that formulated in Lochner.146 The Lochner Court explained that
where legislation that may offend rights granted by the
Constitution is concerned, the court must ask whether the law is
“a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power
of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference?”147 Without this analysis, the Court stated, “the
[Fourteenth] Amendment would have no efficacy.”148 Similarly,
the U.S. Trust Court articulated that, without a court’s inquiry
into whether a law impairing a contractual obligation is
reasonable and necessary to achieve an important public
purpose, “the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all”
because a state could just “reduce its financial obligations . . . for
what[ever] it regarded as an important public purpose.”149
U.S. Trust, therefore, not only revitalized the Contract
Clause, but also unearthed Lochner. Both the Lochner Court and
the U.S. Trust Court recognized the need to reconcile the dueling
constitutional goals to maintain state sovereignty and place a
check on police powers. In pursuing these objectives, both Courts
devised similar methodologies. For Contract Clause purposes, a
Lochner-like level of review is appropriate when public contracts
are impaired by state legislation. Since U.S. Trust, however,
lower courts have struggled with the amount of deference owed
to state legislatures, most notably when state laws impair public
sector collective bargaining agreements.150

144

See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 55.
Id. at 56; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. 1 at 29.
146
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56–57.
147
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
148
Id.
149
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
150
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hat
does giving less deference to the legislature actually mean?”).
145
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III. STATE IMPAIRMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR CONTRACTS
While the U.S. Trust doctrine has proved to give significant
guidance to the lower courts, it has created ambiguities as to the
amount of deference owed to state legislatures, perhaps out of a
fear of being too Lochnerian.151 Part III first compares two recent
cases, Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe and Fraternal Order
of Police v. Prince George’s County. Through these two cases,
Part III demonstrates that lower courts struggle with the U.S.
Trust “less deference” standard as applied to state legislation
impairing public sector labor contracts and that there are not
only inter-circuit splits, but also intra-circuit splits over the
amount of deference given to legislatures. Second, Part III
argues that a proper application of U.S. Trust and strong public
policy considerations demand that courts apply strict scrutiny
when public sector labor contracts are impaired by state
legislation, even though these laws are predominately economic
in nature.152
A.

Lower Court Confusion: Divergent Levels of Deference Creates
Different Levels of Protection for Public Employees—A Need
for Uniformity

1.

The Second Circuit: Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe

In 2003, the City of Buffalo, New York faced an enormous
fiscal crisis, and experts projected that Buffalo’s financial health
would continue to deteriorate.153 After an investigation by the
state comptroller,154 the state legislature enacted the Buffalo
151

See id. at 370–71; Lee, supra note 78, at 1642–43.
The fact that these laws are primarily economic is important because,
traditionally, courts give greater deference to legislatures for economic and social
legislation. This strict scrutiny of economic legislation, while appropriate and
necessary, is a departure from modern jurisprudence. See, e.g., U.S. Trust, 431 U.S.
at 22–23 (“As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, however,
courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness
of a particular measure . . . . When a State impairs the obligation of its own contract,
the reserved-powers doctrine has a different basis.” (citation and footnote omitted)).
153
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 365. The comptroller projected the
following budget deficits: “$7.5 million for 2002–03, $30–$46 million for 2004–05,
$76–$107 million for 2005–06, and $93–$127 million for 2006–07.” Id.
154
The state comptroller determined that Buffalo’s budget deficits would
increase exponentially over the next three years. As a result, the comptroller
determined that Buffalo was not equipped to remedy its fiscal woes without
152
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Fiscal Stability Authority Act (the “Act”), which adopted the
recommendations of the comptroller, created the Buffalo Fiscal
Authority (“BFSA”), and granted it the power to institute wage
freezes. Approximately nine months after the passage of the Act,
the BFSA realized that the budget deficit for fiscal year 2004–
2005 would be $20 million greater than previously anticipated.155
The BFSA, therefore, instituted a wage freeze on all covered
employees.156 Soon thereafter, the Buffalo Teachers Union and
several other unions (“Unions”) brought suit, seeking a judgment
declaring that the wage freezes were, among other claims,
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause as the wage freezes
permanently cancelled certain wage increases to which the
teachers were contractually entitled.157
The Second Circuit held that wage freezes were a substantial
impairment, as wage increases are both an inducement for
employees to enter into a labor contract and a central provision
on which employees reasonably rely.158 But the court ultimately
held that the wage freezes did not violate the Contract Clause
because it was a reasonable and necessary measure to achieve an
important public purpose.159 The court’s application of the “less
deference” standard in reaching its holding, however, was a
misapplication of the U.S. Trust rule.
First, the court incorrectly questioned which standard of
review was applicable, when U.S. Trust makes it clear that the
“less deference” standard is the one to apply. The court grappled
with the appropriate standard of review because the contracts
were between the Unions and the City of Buffalo, rather than
between the Unions and New York State.160 The defendants
argued that more deference should be afforded because the state
was not a party to the contract, while the Unions argued that
“less deference” should be afforded because the legislation was

legislative intervention and recommended the establishment of the BFSA to oversee
Buffalo’s finances and to have the authority to institute wage freezes in the event
that the BFSA declared a fiscal crisis. Id. at 365–66.
155
See id. at 366.
156
See id. at 366–67.
157
See id. at 367; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants et al. at 9–10, Buffalo Teachers
Fed’n, 464 F.3d 362 (No. 05-4744).
158
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 368.
159
See id. at 371.
160
See id. at 369–70.
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nevertheless self-serving.161 The court noted that such legislation
may be self-serving even though the state was not a party but
that “this is [not] the sort of case in which the state legislature
‘welches’ on its obligations as a matter of ‘political
expediency.’ ”162 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that
they need not resolve the level of deference that is appropriate
for such a case but that they would “assume that the lower level
of deference applies” because “the wage freeze is reasonable and
necessary even under the less deferential standard.”163
From the beginning, the court’s explanation for applying a
less deferential standard was convoluted. By stating that this
did not seem like a case where the legislature was acting out of
self-interest, the court already afforded the legislature too much
discretion. Just because the court thought that, in this situation,
the legislature would not act out of self-serving motives does not
mean that the legislature did not act out of self-serving motives.
In fact, the whole purpose of the “less deference” standard is to
ensure that the legislature acted in the best interest of the
public, not to assume that it did under the circumstances.164
Second, once it concluded that the “less deference” standard
did apply, the court then veered from U.S. Trust in its actual
application of the standard. The court acknowledged that the
true meaning of the “less deference” standard is difficult to
ascertain.165 Additionally, the court hastened to point out that
“less deference does not imply no deference” and that less
deference also does not mean “strict scrutiny” because, otherwise,
“[s]uch a high level of judicial scrutiny . . . would harken a
dangerous return to the days of Lochner v. New York.”166 While
the U.S. Trust “less deference” standard is an elusive one and
should be clarified by the Court, the Second Circuit should have
looked to the Court’s application of the “less deference” standard

161

See id.
Id. at 370.
163
Id.
164
See Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a state-imposed payroll lag violated the Contract Clause and noting
that “if the federal judiciary’s proper role were as supine as defendants assert it to
be, the contract clause would be a ‘dead letter’ ”).
165
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 370–71.
166
Id.
162
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in U.S. Trust rather than assume that it would automatically
morph into a “superlegislature” if a strict scrutiny standard was
applied.167
Third, while analyzing whether the law was necessary, the
court incorrectly stated that it need not explore whether another,
better alternative existed to shrink the budget deficit.168 The
U.S. Trust Court, however, did determine that other solutions
would have been better than impairing the existing contract and
even pointed out what those solutions were.169 Namely, when
discussing whether the repeal was necessary, the U.S. Trust
Court noted that the state could have raised taxes or increased
tolls.170 In contrast, in Buffalo Teachers, although the Unions
pointed out that the City could have further raised taxes,171 the
court rejected this proposition, in part, because it is always
conceivable to raise taxes to meet a fiscal crisis and because there
was “no need to second-guess the wisdom of picking the wage
freeze over other policy alternatives.”172 While the Second Circuit
purported to give less deference to legislative judgment, its
adamant refusal to scrutinize whether feasible alternatives
existed completely fell out of line with the U.S. Trust analysis.
Finally, Buffalo Teachers misapplied the reasonableness
element of U.S. Trust. Rather than using the foreseeability test
employed in U.S. Trust,173 the Second Circuit focused only on the
extent of the impairment caused by the wage freezes and
concluded that the prospective and temporary nature of the wage
freezes deemed them reasonable.174 While the U.S. Trust Court
stated that the extent of the impairment was a factor to consider
in assessing the reasonableness of legislation,175 the Court also
stated that the extent of the impairment was not dispositive.176
167

See id.
Id. at 370.
169
See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29–30, 31 n.29.
170
See id. at 31 n.29.
171
See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants et al. at 25–26, Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464
F.3d 362 (No. 05-4744).
172
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 372.
173
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32.
174
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371–72.
175
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 27.
176
See id. (noting that the repeal could not be sustained “simply because the
bondholders’ rights were not totally destroyed”); see also McGarry, supra note 124,
at 70 n.12 (noting that the U.S. Trust Court rejected the lower court’s “total
destruction test”).
168
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In fact, the Court hinged its conclusion that the repeal was
unreasonable on given that the need to regulate automobile use
and increase mass transit in the New York City area was known
at the time the parties entered into the contract.177 The Second
Circuit, therefore, completely ignored that the City of Buffalo
may have known, or at least was able to foresee, that it would be
unable to meet its financial obligations when it entered into the
contracts with the Unions. By failing to explore whether the City
of Buffalo foresaw its looming budget deficits when it entered
into the contracts, the court skipped an indispensible element of
the U.S. Trust test.
The Buffalo Teachers decision departs not only from
Supreme Court precedent but also from other Second Circuit
precedent, further demonstrating the rift and confusion in the
lower courts. In Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York,178 the Second
Circuit adopted a “less deference” standard179 and invalidated a
New York statute that would have financed the expansion of the
court system by deferring the payment of court employee wages
for two weeks.180 Not unlike the energy crisis that the state
claimed necessitated the repeal in U.S. Trust or the exponential
growth of budget deficits that the state claimed justified the
wage freezes in Buffalo Teachers, in Surrogates, the state
asserted that a fiscal crisis demanded that the pay lags be
implemented so as to provide courts with adequate services.181
First, Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates differed as to amount
of consideration that is to be given to the government's
alternatives to deal with the budgetary issue. Relying on U.S.
Trust and its suspicion that the state was motivated by political
expedience, Surrogates found that the pay lags were unnecessary
and concluded that raising taxes or shifting the cost from another
service were less draconian alternatives, though perhaps not the
most politically preferred.182 The court also noted that, by raising
taxes or cutting other governmental programs, the burden is
spread out among all of the citizens, rather than placed entirely

177

See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32.
940 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1991).
179
See id. at 771–72.
180
See id.
181
See id. at 773.
182
See id. (noting that the lag-payroll scheme “smacks of the political expediency
that United States Trust Co. warned of”).
178
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on the shoulders of the judiciary employees.183 Buffalo Teachers,
on the other hand, expressly dismissed these alternatives.184
Second, Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates differed in the
weight given to the existence of an “emergency.” Buffalo
Teachers attempted to distinguish itself from Surrogates because,
unlike Surrogates, Buffalo faced a real emergency.185 In fact, the
court stated that its holding could be summed up by the fact that,
“[a]n emergency exists in Buffalo that furnishes a proper
occasion for the state and BFSA to impose a wage freeze to
‘protect the vital interests of the community,’ and the existence of
the emergency ‘cannot be regarded as a subterfuge or as lacking
in adequate basis.’ ”186 Through this attempt, however, rather
than expose that a different holding was warranted, Buffalo
Teachers further revealed its misapplication of U.S. Trust.
Buffalo Teachers’ emphasis on the existence of an emergency is a
departure from both Surrogates, which gave no weight to
whether there was an emergency, and U.S. Trust, which does not
require such an analysis. The existence of an emergency as a
relevant factor in determining the legitimacy of state legislation
was first incorporated in the 1934 Blaisdell decision, but was one
of five considerations.187 Never in Supreme Court Contract
Clause jurisprudence was the existence of an emergency a
dispositive factor in upholding state legislation.188 Moreover,
under the modern Contract Clause analysis articulated by the
U.S. Trust Court, the existence of an emergency situation is no
longer necessary.189 If, to uphold state legislation, the existence
of an emergency is no longer a necessary condition, then it is
hardly likely that the existence of an emergency is sufficient, by

183

See id.
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 2006).
185
See id. at 372–73.
186
Id. at 373 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444
(1934)).
187
See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
188
See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).
189
See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412; U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 22 (1977); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38–40 (1940).
184
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itself, to sustain state legislation.190
In Buffalo Teachers,
therefore, the Second Circuit departed from both its own and
Supreme Court precedent.191
2.

The Fourth Circuit: Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince
George’s County

The most recent case deciding the constitutionality of
legislation impairing a public sector labor contract is Fraternal
Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s County.192 Unlike
the Second Circuit’s holding in Buffalo Teachers193 and a previous
Fourth Circuit decision, Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor,194
the Prince George’s Court, a district court within the Fourth
Circuit, held that furloughs implemented by the county violated
the Contract Clause.195 While all three cases arose under similar
factual situations—public employees challenged a legislative
effort to meet financial shortcomings by withholding promised
wages—the Prince George’s district court decision reached a
different result.196
As did Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates, the Prince George’s
case arose out of a legislative act to reduce budget deficits by
cutting public employees’ contractually promised wages. In
September of 2008, Prince George’s County attempted to close a
$57 million budget gap by $20 million by implementing an
Employee Furlough Plan (“EFP”), which temporarily furloughed
approximately 5,900 County employees.197
These public
employees were members of various Unions, including the
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89, the International Fire
Fighters Association Prince George’s County Local 1619, Inc.,
190
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23 n.19 (“Undoubtedly the existence of an
emergency and the limited duration of a relief measure are factors to be assessed in
determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but they cannot be regarded as
essential in every case.”).
191
Compare Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 36–73, with Ass’n of Surrogates
v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 771–74 (2d Cir. 1991), and U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 20–32.
192
645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 518 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
193
See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 373 (holding a wage freeze was a
reasonable and necessary impairment under the Contract Clause).
194
See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that furloughs were an impairment permitted under the Contract Clause).
195
See 645 F. Supp. 2d at 518. Again, it is important to note that the district
court was overruled by the Fourth Circuit. See Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d at 193
(4th Cir. 2010).
196
Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 518–19.
197
See id. at 500–01.
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and the American Federation of State and Municipal Employees
(“AFSCME”), AFL-CIO.198 By cutting the work hours of all
covered employees by eighty-eight hours during fiscal year 2009,
the EFP effectively reduced these employees’ annual salaries by
3.85%.199 Consequently, the Unions brought suit against the
County in federal court, alleging, in part, that the EFP violated
the Contract Clause.200
The factual context in Prince George’s was remarkably
similar to a 1993 Fourth Circuit case, Baltimore Teachers, in
which Baltimore, in response to a budgetary shortfall,
implemented a plan under which it ultimately reduced the
annual salaries of public employees by approximately one
percent through deductions from five of their semi-monthly
paychecks.201 Claiming to have followed U.S. Trust, Baltimore
Teachers found the salary reductions to be permitted under the
Contract Clause.202 However, in doing so, it misapplied that
standard by ignoring the distinction between public and private
contracts and affording the legislature too much discretion. More
than fifteen years later, Prince George’s purported to “follow the
lead” of both the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Teachers and the
Supreme Court in U.S. Trust.203 Prince George’s, however, more
appropriately adhered to the U.S. Trust standard than did
Baltimore Teachers.204
Prince George’s and Baltimore Teachers both correctly
identified the nature of the harm caused by the governmental
action. Both courts properly began with finding that a contract
existed between the unions and the government and the
legislation enacted to reduce the budget deficits was a
“substantial impairment” of the collective bargaining
agreements205 because, under Supreme Court precedent, “the
right abridged was one that induced the parties to contract in the

198

See id. at 494.
See id. at 501.
200
See id.
201
See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).
202
See id. at 1022.
203
See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 509–10.
204
See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that “less” deference still
permits the court to give some deference to the legislature); Lee, supra note 78, at
1643–49.
205
See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1015; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 509–
10.
199
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first place.”206 Baltimore Teachers noted that, in the employment
context, there is perhaps no contractual component that induces
parties to contract and on which parties rely on more than
compensation.207 Following suit, the Prince George’s Court noted
that the EFP constituted a substantial impairment because, as
implemented, it abridged the compensation for which the union
employees bargained and subjected every employee to a loss of
eighty hours of pay.208
Where Baltimore Teachers and Prince George’s departed is in
the examination of the reasonableness and necessity of the
contract impairing legislation.209 Baltimore Teachers, unlike
Prince George’s, misapplied the reasonableness element. Where
U.S. Trust focused on whether the impairing state action was a
response to an unforeseen change of circumstances,210 Baltimore
Teachers acknowledged the U.S. Trust foreseeability test only in
a footnote, but never inquired as to whether Baltimore faced an
unforeseen change in circumstances, prompting the city to
implement the furloughs.211 Instead, Baltimore Teachers found
the impairment was reasonable based on factors that are
traditionally considered when private contracts are impaired.212
206
Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1017 (citing El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514
(1965) and Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 235, 243 n.14 (1978)).
207
See id. at 1018.
208
See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 510. It was with the first prong of
the Contract Clause analysis that the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district
court. Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d at 189. The Fourth Circuit found that the district
court erred in ruling that the collective bargaining agreements were impaired. Id. at
190. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Prince George’s County Personnel Law
included the authorization for furloughs. Because “[i]t is a cardinal principle of
contract interpretation that the parties are presumed to contract against the
backdrop of relevant law . . . all . . . relevant laws must be read into the agreement of
the parties just as if expressly provided by them.” Id. at 191. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit concluded, because the Personnel Law authorized furloughs, the Unions’
collective bargaining agreements included a provision permitting furloughs. Id.
Thus, there was no impairment and the Unions’ Contract Clause claims failed. It is
important to note, however, that although the Fourth Circuit overruled the district
court, the Fourth Circuit did not criticize, or even mention, the district court’s level
of review.
209
See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1018; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 510–
11.
210
See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1977).
211
See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1021 n.13.
212
See id. at 1021 (“[T]he furlough plan possessed, not insignificantly, each of
the attributes identified in Spannaus as present in various state laws that had
impaired private contracts but survived Contract Clause challenge.” (emphasis
added)). The court found that the salary reduction plan was reasonable because it
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Prince George’s, on the other hand, found that the furloughs were
not reasonable because the plan was not narrowly tailored and
the shortfalls were perhaps foreseeable.213 Prince George’s,
therefore, applied the appropriate reasonableness test.
Moving on to the necessary analysis, Prince George’s more
accurately followed the U.S. Trust test, from which the Baltimore
Teachers Court again departed.214 Part of the Supreme Court’s
necessity inquiry hinged on the existence of feasible alternatives.
One of the alternatives the Court took note of in U.S. Trust was
the ability of the state to raise taxes. Ignoring the Supreme
Court’s indication that governments should virtually always be
held to their financial obligations,215 Baltimore Teachers refused
to even consider the alternative of raising taxes because it
believed that this alternative would always be available to
overturn a state’s impairment of its own financial obligations.216
Prince George’s and Baltimore Teachers also varied as to
their analysis of the necessity of the government's actions. In
contrast, Prince George’s noted that the furloughs were not
necessary because the county had $97 million in untapped
reserve funds when it implemented the furloughs. The court
noted that, without an attempt to first use some of that money to
close the budget gaps, the county did not adequately exhaust

was aimed to deal with a broad, generalized economic problem, it targeted all
employees, rather than a specific class of employees, it “affected reliance interests
not wholly unlike those of private entities in regulated industries, which contract
subject to future, additional regulation,” and it affected only a temporary alteration
of the contractual relationship. Id. (emphasis added).
213
Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (emphasis added). Interestingly,
Prince George’s cited to page 1020 of Baltimore Teachers when it mentioned its
reservations about whether the shortfalls were unforeseen. Id. Nowhere on page
1020, or anywhere in the Baltimore Teachers opinion, however, does the word
“unforeseen” appear. See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1020.
214
See Lee, supra note 78, at 1646.
215
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25. The Court quoted the following passage:
The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to
repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties . . . . [T]he contract
should be regarded as an assurance that such a right will not be exercised.
A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the
promise, is an absurdity.
Id. at 25 n.23 (quoting Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)); see also
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14
(1983) (“In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its
contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets.”).
216
See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1019–20.
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other feasible alternatives.217 In concluding its analysis for
whether the furloughs were necessary, Prince George’s again
mentioned that, under the Contract Clause, the county does not
enjoy “wide discretionary latitude” in choosing among
alternatives to remedy its fiscal problems.218 And, the court
made clear that while it would not instruct the county on its
fiscal affairs, it believed that other, less draconian and more
feasible alternatives existed.219 Finally, the court articulated its
suspicion that the furloughs were merely a politically expedient
method to accomplish the county’s goal to reduce its budget
deficit and that such a motive is one that the Contract Clause
exists, in part, to prevent.220
The dichotomous holdings and the varying level of deference
afforded to the legislatures, both within and among the circuits,
illustrate the inconsistencies amid the lower courts in applying
the third prong of the U.S. Trust test.221 As a more scrutinizing
level of review has proven to result in finding furloughs, wage
217

See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
See id. at 516.
219
Id. at 513.
220
Id. at 510–11.
221
The Second and Fourth Circuits are not the only courts that have reviewed
this issue. In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
a preliminary injunction preventing the state from implementing delays in issuance
of pay checks pursuant to a statute because the statutory scheme represented
substantial impairment of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement for Contracts
Clause purposes, and the state failed to demonstrate that the statute delaying
issuance of payroll checks was “reasonable and necessary to fulfill an important
public purpose in light of Hawaii’s budgetary crisis.” Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly
v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, in 1997, the District
of Columbia Circuit held that emergency rules establishing reduction-in-force
(“RIF”) procedures were expressly authorized by congressional legislation and, thus,
were insulated from challenge under the Contract Clause when teachers who were
laid off during a RIF sued the board of education. Wash. Teachers’ Union Local #6 v.
Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In 1995, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ruled that furloughs imposed, in response to a fiscal crisis, on
unionized state employees earning more than $20,000 violated the Contract Clause
because they were neither reasonable nor necessary. Mass. Cmty. Coll. Counsel v.
Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 716 (Mass. 1995). Moreover, in 1992, in response to
a House of Representatives opinion request on the constitutionality of state-imposed
furloughs, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the furloughs were, in fact,
a violation of the Contract Clause as unreasonable and unnecessary impairments of
state employees’ collective bargaining agreements. Opinion of the Justices
(Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1212 (N.H. 1992). Finally, in 1985, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a declared financial emergency did not justify the state’s
legislatively authorized refusal to implement bargained-for salary increases for
certain state employees. Carlstrom v. State, 694 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Wash. 1985).
218
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freezes, payroll lags, and other contract impairing legislation
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause, varying levels of
judicial deference directly correlates to the amount of protection
extended to public employees. The divergent results throughout
the country juxtaposed with the increasing frequency at which
legislatures resort to these types of deficit-reducing means
demonstrates the need for the Supreme Court to review this
issue so that there may be a uniform level of review and a
consistent level of protection afforded to public employees.
B.

The Need for Strict Scrutiny in Legislation that Impairs
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements: Why
Lochner Still Lives

As evidenced by the varied amount of scrutiny that lower
courts apply to state laws that impair public contracts, the U.S.
Trust “less deference” standard has proven to obscure rather
than elucidate.222 In modern constitutional jurisprudence, courts
apply minimal scrutiny to economic and social legislation and
strict scrutiny to legislation that offends personal liberties.223
The level of scrutiny for Contract Clause violations, therefore,
should conform to one of these customary approaches. Even
though Contract Clause claims arise predominately out of
economic or social legislation, it seems as though the U.S. Trust
Court intended to rule that strict scrutiny should be applied
when public contracts are impaired because “a state’s self
interest is at stake.”224 This standard would not only resolve the
inconsistencies in the lower courts but also appeal to the
enormous public interest that demands that strict scrutiny be
applied to laws that impair public sector labor contracts.
As several lower courts that have been more willing to apply
strict scrutiny have commented, public employees deserve the
utmost protection.225 A common denominator of most of the
public sector Contract Clause litigation is some sort of financial

222

See supra Part III.A and cases cited within.
See note 50 and accompanying text.
224
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (noting that “[a]
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do
not have to be raised”).
225
See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1105 (citing Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940
F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991)).
223
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or economic crisis.226 The states or local governments enter into
collective bargaining agreements with public sector labor unions,
guaranteeing, among other things, certain hours and wages. But
then, at the first sign of an economic downturn, these
governments take drastic measures, such as furloughs or wage
freezes, that substantially impair these contracts.227 As the
Second and Ninth Circuits correctly noted, while soaring budget
deficits may seem to justify such drastic legislative acts, in the
government’s attempt to lessen its own fiscal crisis, it creates and
exacerbates public employees’ financial hardships.228
This logic demonstrates that implementing furloughs or
wage freezes solves one economic problem simply by causing
countless others. Significantly decreasing the income of these
already underpaid public sector employees will likely have an
adverse ripple effect on other already devastated markets, such
as the housing industry and the auto industry, due to their
inability to meet their financial commitments.229 John and
Carrie Anne Quintos of Chino California, state workers whose
combined $70,000 annual salary was cut by fourteen percent due
to the furloughs, are an example of how the furloughs simply
perpetuate a vicious circle.230 As a result of their pay cuts, the
Quintos’s could no longer afford their car payments or their home
mortgage payments and, because they owed more than the
property was worth, they were forced to sublet, rather than
sell.231 Their tenants, however, missed a few payments, causing
the Quintos’s themselves to miss mortgage payments and fall

226
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 13–14; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 492,
494–95 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 408 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v.
Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2006); Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6
F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).
227
See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 13–14; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 494–
95; Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 365; Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1014.
228
See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940
F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991)).
229
See id.; Clarke, supra note 87, at 248–50 (endorsing the U.S. Trust rationale
because it protects individual reliance interests and encourages states to contract
efficiently); Lee, supra note 78, at 1649 (noting that the higher scrutiny mandated in
U.S. Trust promotes economic stability).
230
Goldmacher, supra note 1.
231
Id.
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behind in rent they were paying to live in a townhouse.232
Ultimately, their car was repossessed in a parking lot, and they
were forced to relinquish the townhouse.233
In addition to meeting individual financial obligations, these
public employees rely on the promised wages to afford other
common necessities, such as food, clothing, and their children’s
education.234
While these life-sustaining items are not
enumerated as fundamental rights in the text of the
Constitution, most would concede that they are no less
fundamental than the right to speak one’s mind or choose one’s
own religion.
If the courts must apply strict scrutiny to
legislation that inhibits individuals’ rights to practice a religion
of their choosing, then it is not farfetched to require the courts to
apply strict scrutiny to legislation that will deprive public
employees of the means to purchase basic human needs.
Furthermore, a more scrutinizing review of contractimpairing
legislation
will
accommodate
other
policy
considerations. First, a relaxed Contract Clause will give state
legislatures greater power to unilaterally modify the agreements
they enter into, thus inflating the risk component of the contract
price.235 Therefore, employees may demand a risk premium
before agreeing to work due to a magnified fear that the state
will breach.236 Consequently, the state will have to pay more for
public contracts237 or reduce the quality of services offered.238
Increasing risk premiums, therefore, will reduce economic
stability and diminish faith in contractual relations—results
antithetical to both U.S. Trust and the larger purpose of the
Contract Clause itself.
Another policy consideration is that public employees are,
among other indispensible occupations, our police, our
firefighters, our teachers, our sanitation and mass transit
workers. Without them, gangs, not justice, would rule the

232

Id.
Id. John moved in with his parents thirty miles away; Carrie Ann stayed in
Chino with their four children. Id.
234
See Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that food and clothing are necessities of life); Lee, supra note 78, at
1645.
235
See Clarke, supra note 87, at 242–43.
236
See Lee, supra note 78, at 1649–50.
237
See Clarke, supra note 87, at 242–43.
238
See Lee, supra note 78, at 1649–50.
233
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streets, fires would blaze unabated, children would go untaught,
garbage would linger, and the pace of our days would come to a
halt. If laws that impair these public employees’ contracts need
only to stand the test of minimum scrutiny, then they would be
sustained more often than invalidated.239 Accordingly, public
employees who doubt the stability of their contracts would
perform less efficiently on the job and be less dedicated to their
work.240 The risk of reducing the efficiency, productivity, and
commitment of public sector employees far outweighs the
inconvenience of forcing policy makers to rethink their legislative
schemes.
Despite these compelling policy considerations, however,
some argue that the U.S. Trust “less deference” standard—and
therefore, the strict scrutiny standard—provides too much
protection for public contracts241 and is an inexcusable return to
Lochner-like judicial intrusion on legislative judgment.242 But it
is time to stop fearing judicial oversight into legislative action
that impairs the state’s own financial obligations. Such review
will not revive an era defined by the judiciary sitting as a
superlegislature—those days are gone.243 When public contracts,
especially public sector labor contracts, are impaired by selfserving state legislation, it is the court’s constitutional duty to
question the reasonableness and necessity of that legislation in
accordance with the Contract Clause.244

239
See, e.g., Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372–73 (2d Cir. 2006);
Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993).
240
See Lee, supra note 78, at 1650.
241
See Clarke, supra note 87, at 251–52 (suggesting that the U.S. Trust test
should be replaced with an approach that would invoke Contract Clause protection
only upon legislative failure “to recognize the reliance interests of the contractors”).
242
Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 371 (noting that applying strict scrutiny to the
government’s wage freezes would be a dangerous return to the long discarded
Lochner).
243
See Barnett, supra note 19 (asserting that “the real problem with the
judiciary today is not that it has thwarted the majority’s will, but that it has
succumbed to it”).
244
See Randy Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservativism v. A Principled
Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 276 (1987) (“Judges are therefore
inescapably responsible for developing, justifying, and applying substantive rules
and standards for normatively evaluating human conduct—including the conduct of
legislatures acting collectively.” (emphasis added)).
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This level of review is not repugnant to the constitutional
notion of separation of powers.245 To begin, requiring the courts
to strictly scrutinize laws that impair public contracts does not
correlate to a sanction for the courts to proclaim what, in their
view, the laws should be—a role reserved for the legislature.
Instead, permitting the courts to strictly scrutinize publiccontract impairing legislation enables the courts to fulfill their
duty to declare what the law, under the Constitution of the
United States, cannot be.
At least in the application of Contract Clause doctrine to
public sector labor contracts, the courts are—and those that are
not, should be—moving toward a judicial approach that
constitutional law scholar Randy Barnett refers to as “Footnote
Four-Plus.”246
Under “Footnote Four-Plus” jurisprudence—a
compromise of sort between judicial conservatives and
progressives—courts enforce the express prohibitions of the
Constitution plus “some judicially-selected ‘fundamental’
unenumerated rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’ ”247
This approach strikes an appropriate balance
between judicial passivity and activism by allowing the courts to
defer to the legislature where no fundamental enumerated or
unenumerated rights are violated yet also to make calculated,
responsible decisions to protect certain unenumerated individual
rights when necessary.248
Additionally, all federal judges, and many state judges, are
not elected, but are appointed to decide between conflicting
claims of right.249 Judges are appointed with the expectation and
belief that they will decide cases in a “principled and morally
justified manner”250 and that they will both adhere to the black
letter law and develop a common law system comprised of
245
See id. (noting that federal judges have no authority to exercise executive
functions or to spend state or federal tax moneys).
246
See Barnett, supra note 254, at 328 (noting that judicial conservatives strictly
adhere to the rule espoused in footnote four of the Caroline Products decision—that
state legislation should be strictly scrutinized only when enumerated constitutional
rights are transgressed).
247
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
248
Professor Barnett also refers to this judicial role as “principled judicial
activism.” See Barnett, supra note 244, at 276–77.
249
See id. at 277 (noting that even those judges that are elected are not elected
to legislate).
250
Id. at 286.
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“substantive standards that are as much a product of collective
wisdom as the statutory output of Congress.”251 The American
legal system thus affords the judiciary significant power but also
has great faith that that power will be used responsibly. Finally,
the appellate process exists as an internal self-regulating
mechanism,252 and the Constitution provides two important
external safeguards on the judiciary: The Senate may scrutinize
the judicial philosophy of all judicial appointments, and the
Senate may impeach federal judges.253 An abuse of judicial
power, therefore, will not go unnoticed or unchecked.
CONCLUSION
While Lochner likely did reach the wrong result, it is time to
doubt that both its holding and its use of substantive due process
were wrong.254 As stated by the Lochner Court,
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court
for that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the
state it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be
totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the
question would still remain: Is it within the police power of the
state? and that question must be answered by the court.255

As illustrated, even the reviled Lochner Court knew and
appreciated that there were limits to judicial review, but also saw
that there was a need for the judiciary to ensure that the
legislature was acting within its powers.
Though Lochner may still be regarded as a reprehensible
usurpation of legislative power or an illegitimate intrusion of
laissez faire economic policy into constitutional analysis, this
interpretation is no longer entirely controlling.
Where
Lochnerian jurisprudence once deprived workers of state
protection from unscrupulous employers, it now has the
potential, if used appropriately and responsibly, to shield
workers from politically expedient state legislation.256 Over one

251

Id. at 287.
See id.
253
See id.
254
See Randy Barnett, Foreword: What’s So Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 325, 328–29 (2005) (noting that substantive due process is not
inherently wrong).
255
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905).
256
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 712.
252
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hundred years after it was decided and over seventy years after
it was abandoned, as ironic as it is, perhaps now we see that from
Lochner comes enlightenment.

The great danger is that, once in office, legislators need no longer rely upon
naked aggression to exact private gain, but can instead enlist the force of
the state by passing laws that work to advance their own interests at the
expense of the public or some part of it. Legislators, in other words, cannot
be given the power of absolute owners because they hold power as trustees
for the benefit of the public. The old maxim, “A public office is a public
trust,” is not simply metaphor. Those entrusted with public power act as
fiduciaries and must avoid conflicts of interest every bit as much as private
trustees who hold the reins of power for private beneficiaries.
Id.

